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This paper by Anton, Hernandez and Levy (2012, AHL henceforth) is motivated by the analysis by Santiago Levy (2008) on the impact on the labor market of subsidized programs that deviate demand from funded social insurance programs. It contains an estimation of the response of tax collections to an elimination of exemptions in the value added tax law and of some social security contributions, and an argument proposing that individual leadership is key to overcome vested interests for the evolution of social and tax policy.
Following the classic analysis in the two sector model by Harberger (1962) , Marrufo (2001) developed the argument and attempted an identification of the impact of taxes on labor supply towards the formal sector. The goal of AHL is to evaluate a fiscal reform agenda in this framework. Specifically, the scheme is to eliminate some payrollbased contributions and the tax exemption to sales of food and of drugs. The main claim is that the elimination of the differentiated rates on the Value Added Tax (VAT) will yield tax revenues so high that the Federal government will be able to finance a universal social security system for health and pensions, plus the loss of income from eliminating some social security taxes, plus resources sufficient to compensate one fifth of the population for the higher VAT. The argument on the elimination of the informal labor market hinges on the behavior of the relative price of labor used by a tax-evading sector and a sector of tax-complying firms, and upon very large values of the elasticities of labor supply and labor demand. However, the possibility of funding the social protection system depends almost wholly upon a very large increase in VAT collections, that should become twice as large as their historical maximum after the exemptions for food and drugs are eliminated.
This being a policy issue, I prefer to state at the outset that I find the economic argument and the basic proposal quite amenable. Mexican taxation policy has been in a war with itself for over twenty years, sometimes driving down marginal taxes on labor in significant amounts, sometimes increasing them, and without a consistent evaluation of the links to social security. Between the late eighties and the mid-nineties, the federal government reduced substantially the marginal income tax rates, while social security taxes were being increased. Then, income tax and social security tax policies entered into alignment. The 1995 reform to social security reduced the marginal tax rate for health insurance from nearly 12.5 to 0 for low income workers and to 2% for those with taxable wages above the equivalent of three minimum wages, it shifted the old-age pension system to individual accounts, and it forced the housing fund-which for 20 years had all but forfeited its obligations to savers-to report the value of savings to workers as part of the statement of the pension fund managers. After the recession of 2000-2001, taxes on labor have been crawling up again in the form of higher income taxes and of a new "entrepreneurial tax" which is a sort of alternative minimum tax on the self-employed and small firms. In parallel, social assistance programs have been growing, sometimes in explicit competition with social insurance. In economics, size is important, and subsidized programs attending the poor, especially the rural poor, may not affect urban labor markets.
When subsidized programs become large they begin to attract workers who otherwise would be willing to pay social security contributions. The damage created by economic distortions increases exponentially with the size of the distortion, so when a State aims for very large subsidized programs that live together with contributory programs, distortions are bound to be very large. This is the argument sustaining the AHL effort, and I agree with it. Yet, the following comments propose that their calculations overstate the potential impact of the specific tax reform plan they evaluate and that the hypothesis on why the scheme they propose has not been adopted is mistaken.
As said before, the article deals mainly with two different issues, one related to optimal taxation, the other to a hypothesis of errors in thinking on public policies that transcend generations. It is convenient to treat them as separate topics, first because the paper aims to present the first as a positive issue, but it does not really provide any argument on the second. The paper also deals with many other issues granted a secondary relevance (in this review but also, I think, in the authors view).
The taxation part is in principle amenable to empirical verification, contains a full argument and can be subject of recalculation and future improvement or rejection by researchers. On the other hand, the argument on the formation of ideas on financing social policy is not needed to sustain the taxation part, and given the limitations indicated below, it requires substantial modifications. As it is, the debate on the formation of ideas actually weakens the tax reform argument. Solving the discussion on the formation of ideas will lead in my opinion to different conclusions.
As a general matter, the paper mixes an attempt on econometric policy evaluation and a policy proposal. George Stigler used to say that it is very hard to make compatible research and reform proposals, because a "reformer must promise paradise if his reform is adopted. Reform and research seldom march arm in arm." This paper contains claims that take Mexico closer to paradise, but are not well supported or even desirable. Take the case of increased national savings: social security can actually reduce them in an optimal way.
In the original Samuelson (1958) paper it is optimal to draw national savings down to zero through mandatory social insurance. Yet, some economists and policy-makers believed that the reform to the pension system in the nineties would increase savings rates, a result that has not arrived and that we should not expect if Samuelson was right. AHL may rethink this issue, because it has little to do with their argument. Another point that is not clear is that tax reform would achieve a "fiscal devaluation". Why is that desirable? Do Mexicans want to subsidize foreign consumers?
The impact of the proposal on the labor market A main statement is that financing social programs through contributions is fatally flawed. This is a radical statement because it is not supported by the reality of many (perhaps most) countries with higher rates of coverage than Mexico. The statement is not necessary to argue in favor of a reform to deal with the main problem identified by AHL.
Namely, non-contributory social programs that subsidize health services and those that provide cash to individuals and to other groups have been growing substantially, creating a wedge between the cost of labor between firms paying taxes and those not paying. A compensated tax reform that increases general consumption taxes and reduces payroll taxes will reduce the wedge. Additionally, the authors argue less convincingly, if taxation for contributory programs is eliminated there is a possibility of an additional (relatively small) increase in collections. However, AHL seem to argue that increases in coverage cannot be sustained while social security taxes exist. Most OECD countries have payroll taxes and higher rates of coverage, and so do Brazil or Uruguay. Brazil has actually been increasing coverage substantially in recent years.
2 As argued below, there are issues of regulation of benefits that are very important to understand segmentation of a labor or a benefit market (e.g. health insurance).
I summarize now the measurements and predictions of the labor market by AHL.
The following graphs take points from Tables 10 and 12 , and the intersection of the demand and supply functions are specific points in those tables. We adjust constant wage-elasticity functions to the data. The functional form is not really important, because we only have two points to fit (AHL have only one, and they project the other).
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The most noticeable issue is that labor supply must be very elastic to sustain the AHL argument, in the order of 2 to 2.5. They assume that the wage-elasticity of labor supply at the intensive margin is zero, so all response comes at the extensive margin, with workers moving across sectors. They do not present any evidence to sustain such high 2 Brazil does not have a payroll-tax-funded health insurance scheme, but taxes for pensions, work risks insurance and unemployment insurance make up for contribution rated higher than those applied by Mexican social security, 3 We have observations on wage and employment in the formal and informal labor markets in Tables 10 and  12 in AHL. Table 10 refers to the existing condition, while Table 12 refers to the prediction on the effect of tax reform. The shift across points is a mix of changes in supply and demand caused by the tax structure. To disentangle them, we draw supply and demand curves that have a constant wage-elasticity. This means we have two parameters to link two points, and we have to assume the value of one of them. For labor supply we assume that the "level" parameter is very small (individuals supply very little labor at very low wages), and this requires a large elasticity of labor supply (which has to take place at the extensive margin, because AHL assume that the wage-elasticity of labor supply at the intensive margin is zero). For labor demand, we assume a "level" parameter that is very high at low levels of employment, and that the wage-elasticity is roughly near unity and falls with employment. Tables 10 and 12 values, but the abundant empirical evidence on labor supply for many countries and my own research for Mexico suggest that a value of 2 is way above anything that can be expected. Certainly, if the issue is only reclassification, of naming everyone formal once a tax is eliminated, then the discussion loses much of its interest.
In Figure 1 we see the labor market in the AHL paper, measured as it is, before a reform. We have a labor supply function conditioned on the existing social security legislation (the status quo), and a hypothetical value in the absence of social security. The AHL projections require a large shift of the labor supply schedule and of the labor demand schedule to fit the points in Table 10 . In Figure 2 , we see the "end of informality" predicated in the title of the paper. Thus, the whole argument rests on very large responses of labor supply and on an elasticity of labor demand of at least one. We have no way of knowing if those values apply, but they seem to be definitely very large, given that labor supply responses are very small in the intensive margin, and change very slowly at the extensive margin.
The response projected by AHL comes from changes in the marginal tax schedules that seem to be rather modest. I explain below some questions on what the specific proposal is, but I understand they get rid only of the tax for health insurance, which is set at a rate of only 2% and only for those earning above three minimum wages, and of a few other taxes for those earning below two minimum wages. As can be seen in Figures 3 to 6, the change in average and marginal tax schedules is small. The main change comes from eliminating the fixed part of health insurance (only health insurance has non-linear features in the tax, all other branches of social security have linear taxes capped at 25 minimum wages as taxable income). Summarizing, the majority of workers only see a reduction of 2% in the marginal tax, and even less for those with income tax liabilities. Thus, AHL propose a very large response to a very small payroll tax reform. Notice that they state that current rates are 32%, but that is plainly wrong. Average rates are never above 30% for social programs and are somewhat above 20% for most workers. Figure 7 shows the current marginal rates on labor income. The schizoid pattern that applies to salary increments at low earnings levels is a consequence of trying to smooth the In Figures 8 and 9 we add the wage subsidy that operates through the income tax, to see how much money is put by the government into supporting each worker, either through the wage subsidy or through social security. The reform proposal increases very substantially the amount of resources per person put into the social protection system. These moneys are related to an increased liability of the government to finance health and pension insurance (for example, it picks the whole bill for everyone for the earnings equivalent up to two minimum wages).
Figures 10 to 12 compare the average total tax bill on labor, currently and under the AHL proposal. The proposal eliminates roughly the same amount in pesos of contribution for everyone, so the proportional effect is larger for low-income workers.
The crux of the fiscal reform argument in AHL is whether the different changes in 
Share of taxable salary
Average rate income tax Total average rate Now, we move on to explain the main projections in the paper. Table 11 in AHL summarizes the main motivation of the model. An extra peso spent on contributory social insurance has a smaller impact on the deficit than an increase in non-contributory programs (the latter not only increase expenditures but also contracts the tax base, so the deficit increases in more than expenditures). The impact of the tax reform can be broken down in the following way. First, the elimination of exemptions to the VAT increases revenues in 3 points of GDP. As pointed out by AHL, the impact will be smaller because higher VAT means lower income tax for corporations and independent service providers. From there, the next cases are developed (they are not identified by title in the AHL paper): a baseline, a proposal and a proposal plus the closing of some fisccla gaps.
A baseline case: an increase in VAT reduces the relative cost of sector B, the untaxed or Repeco firms (Régimen de pequeños contribuyentes), and makes it more expensive to hire workers formally (the relative price of the final production has been reduced). This induces higher expenses by the government on non-contributory social insurance (NCSI). While AHL do not make such identification, I think this baseline describes the predicted effect of VAT reform given Mexican social policy since the minnineties until now. Sedesol and SSA programs (the Social Development and the Health Ministries) grow while social security is kept with rules that erode gradually the State share in financing and the tax base (these are imperfect indexation to wages and inflation, and pay-as-you go financing for health insurance for retirees).
Proposal case. In addition to the increase in VAT, social security contributions are eliminated. AHL forecast that this will increase fiscal revenues a further 0.3% or roughly one tenth of the effect of VAT reform. This case produces an increase in formal employment because the cost of hiring workers legally is smaller. Firms in the "fullyformal" sector (aka sector A) lose any incentive to keep part of the labor force informal, so they simply move all workers into the formal sector. Some "firms" in the non-salaried sector (aka sector B or Repeco) find it convenient to enter the salaried economy. The employment effects are a likely outcome in any model with a regulatory distortion that is eliminated. The fiscal result is more controversial, yet not unlikely. The fiscal result is more likely because of the self-control features of the VAT plus the use of tax deductions of the income tax favor a trend towards a salaried economy. More specifically, if employers do not have to pay social security contributions, and have to pay more VAT, the incentive to bring workers into the formal economy is stronger. The proposed reform makes it profitable to register all family members as regular workers to take advantage of the subsidies of the income tax law and to declare all payments made as deductions.
It is useful at this point to say that the result can be produced by other models with three "sectors", so the VAT variations can impact one margin and the social security tax variations can affect another margin. The economic structure in the AHL paper is useful to set up the argument, but otherwise it is peculiar: sectors A and B (of final goods) can actually produce the same goods, and the formal sector A does not uses as inputs the goods of sector B; these restrictions are certainly not valid in general, and perhaps not even can be seen as dominant or as majority events. I believe the economic argument will gain from pointing out to the general validity of arguments and reducing the stress on econometric policy evaluation (where the paper is very weak). 4 In particular, I agree that the VAT reform will increase collections (it is a tax increase), but it is not possible to give credence to the size of the impact stated (see more anon). Similarly, the elimination of CSI taxes has a first order effect that is to lose collections, so only a feedback mechanism can bring a second order effect to revert the result. Such mechanism here is the change in the incentive from social security taxes (which is to under-declare earnings and to not register working family members and other workers whose individual demand for social insurance is low), to the VAT and income tax-wage subsidy, which motivates firms to register all workers (including owners and the self-employed). This feedback mechanism is independent of the structure of the model presented in the paper. It is possible that the strength of the feedback mechanism will be large enough to achieve an increase in collections, as AHL estimate, but 4 In section 5, the first evaluation of the fitness of the model says that 2008 macroeconomic and fiscal accounts are replicated closely. I believe this is a useful checkpoint, perhaps to develop a baseline, but does not represent an evaluation of the fitness of the model. I would change the title because fitness seems to suggest there is an econometric model sustaining the calculations, while there is actually only one observation in use (the accounts for 2008). For example, important quantities such as income tax revenues or expenditures in programs that are close substitutes to social security are deemed exogenous (see page 29). Thus, the section says that the government accounts are included approximately right, not that the model can mimic the effect of a perturbation (for example, a change in the income tax law). More specifically, there is no strategy to identify the model, and thus, its use for econometric policy evaluation should be seen as limited. The issue is not one of "calibration against estimation". It is an issue of using an overidentified model for econometric policy evaluation. AHL use the term calibration often, but there is no variation in the data to gauge potential variations.
the prediction is ambiguous and there is no basis to state with confidence its value (see more anon).
The tax revenues from consumption taxes increase in 86%, and "a complete shift from labor to consumption taxes increases the VAT revenue/GDP ratio from 0.038 to 0.071". Public expenditure would increases in 2.8% of GDP. Notice that the increase in VAT revenues is 3.3% of GDP, leaving a half point surplus that compensates for the fall in social security revenues. Current expenditures on CSI+NCSI are 3.9% of GDP (footnote 43), of which 1.7% are government expenditures and 2.2% are contributions to social security funds. Thus, the government is expected to double the resources for social programs out of taxing food and drugs.
Proposal plus closing fiscal gaps. This scenario is really the same as the proposal, plus three items that are not modeled, and thus only added to the accounts. One of them has little relation to the general problem in the paper (unfunded labor liabilities in IMSS as a state corporation; while a significant public finance issue, not different from many other liabilities incurred over the years by the federal government). Another one is to eliminate local payroll taxes. This last point is directly relevant to the proposal, but it illustrates a general problem, namely, that the AHL proposal leaves running most of the existing taxes, as well as the administrative procedures that sustain them. The third item is "compensation to the poor" for the increase in VAT.
General considerations on the scenarios. First, the effects of tax reforms are large.
VAT collections have fluctuated around 2.5 and 5.5% of GDP most of the time during the last 30 years. It is hard to measure the impact of reforms akin to the AHL proposal (for example, the 2008 reform to increase the general rate from 15 to 16%, or the 1995 reform to increase it from 10 to 15%), but given that the share of the food and drug industries is certainly below 10% of GDP, there has to be quite a bit of money laundering in those industries to generate tax evasion of a value several times as large as the value of sales (and a multiple of that in value added). For example, the Mexican drug market had sales of 156 billion pesos in 2009, so even if the 16% VAT were to apply to all of this value and if the industry had no cost, revenues would be only 23 billion. The total increase in collections calculated by AHL from taxing food and drugs with the VAT are 42.8 billion (see Table   13 ), but the total increase in collections is ten times that amount. Thus, the feedback effect from eliminating exemptions to a market worth perhaps 268 billion pesos is ten times larger than the collections from the first order effect. During the first, VAT rates were actually reduced, as were income tax rates; social security rates were increased in those years. The tax collection's share of GDP moved from around 9 to 13%, and it fell again to 9% with the crisis of late 1994 and 1995. During the second installment, VAT rates were increased, social security contributions were decreased and income tax rates were kept low. The second period has not had a fall of the curtain as marked as the 1984-94 era, but sometime since 2001, gradual increases began to take place in income tax and VAT rates, plus increases on asset taxes that directly affect the cash remaining in the pocket of workers (such as the federal taxes on the purchase of homes), and the creation of the entrepreneurial tax.
To deal with this issue, AHL present Table 13 . There, it is shown that the exempt sector (#1, food and drugs), generates only 10% of the 432 billion gain in collections. The big plate is really the 380 increase in VAT collections from the salaried-formal-sector A. In turn, 258 of these are forthcoming even if no one in the previously-exempt #1 sector pays any tax! This is possible because, for example, even if a food producer does not pay any VAT, the final seller will do it (after collecting from the consumer). This in fact is the gain from using the VAT, and the first order effect is very likely positive. The issue is one of size: can the elimination of the exemption on sales of food and drugs generate such a large result? Even more, not all food and drug consumption is exempt. Consumer pay VAT for food consumed in restaurants, and drugs, while generally exempt, are complement to other non-exempt services. AHL realize this and argue about chain-effects, the feedback mechanism we mentioned above. While this will be quite likely in operation after eliminating the exemption, there is really no evidence to sustain such a huge elasticity of revenues. This discussion also makes me wonder why the title of the paper stresses the issue of eliminating social security taxes, when 90% of the value of the reform is related to the VAT. Social security taxes really play a secondary role in all of this.
Section 6.3 answers the following question: what is the decrease in social security taxes that leaves the wage unaffected after the elimination of the exemption in VAT for some goods? The answer is a decrease from 28 to 30%, to compensate a potential fall of 4% in wages. I do not see a use for this later (for example, in Table 11 ).
Some additional comments on the model
This section deals with modeling issues and with issues that perhaps need clarification. The paper deals with a variety of topics beyond the tax reform and the political economy issues that are its main thrust. Perhaps a shorter version of the paper would avoid most of these, or a longer version should explain them further. I am not sure these issues are important for the main argument in this paper or if they are included as part of a wider research and reform agenda.
The paper defines a peculiar structure for the economy. There are two final goods (indexed A and B) but one is produced only with non-salaried labor, while the other is produced with two inputs produced with salaried labor and capital. Final good B is produced in the non-salaried sector, and it is meant to represent the Repeco regime. Final good A is produced with inputs from industries #1 and #2, with #1 referring to food and drugs, the final goods exempted from VAT payments.
Personal income taxes are ignored in the analysis (footnote 18). Only firms and workers in the salaried sector pay taxes (on income, value added, and payroll for social security), but one of the input sectors is exempt from value added taxes. This implies VAT is charged on the products of the salaried sector, but the tax exemptions on an input affect relative prices. The non-salaried sector does not pay any tax.
Firms producing intermediate goods are heterogeneous in productivity because of a variable called capital. However, the way this is modeled, it would be more appropriate to name it skill (firms cannot invest in it, it is exogenous). There is an issue here beyond the label of the variable. Referring to equation (1), it is said that there is a representative firm but then it is said that K is distributed exogenously (F must be an arbitrary function because there is no economic argument to expect a certain distribution of exogenous abilities), but then equation (2) defines an economy-wide constraint. Can K be exchanged between firms?
Perhaps equation (2) should be eliminated. Is it needed later? If so, then K is not given in equation (1).
K is complementary to labor, so more skilled firms tend to go into the formal sector and be larger. However, within the formal sector firms can go into the exempt or the taxed areas. We do not expect an unambiguous prediction on whether firms in the taxed sector are larger or not, because of Roy-model arguments. A firm with higher K, does it go to sector 1 or to sector 2? Equation (7) writes down the problem of a representative firm. Again, I do not think the setup is akin to a representation of that sort. Equation (7) must be written as an integral equation because some firms (likely those with very high K) ignore the efficiency variable ξ, while for all others the variable λ changes with K. Alternatively, (7) can be seen not as the problem of a representative firm, but as the general problem of the firms, but then equations (8) and (9) correspond to individual firms and they have to be added to obtain the market functions. I understand that (8) and (9) are described as market functions. In fact, no solution is provided to (7), so just rewriting (7) as an integral equation and getting rid of (2) does not seem to change much of the paper. However, the assumption of a representative firm allows writing equation (13) as the ratio of the demand for labor by firms in the exempt and the taxed intermediate goods producers. Otherwise, equation (13) becomes non-linear and the relation between tax compliance and the relative size of these demand functions is not warranted. To see this, assume the non-taxed goods are consumed in roughly fixed amounts by individuals (so they spend on drugs and food in a very inelastic way), which implies that the amount of labor dedicated to produce them is a function of the distribution of K in that sector. However, we do not know if firms with large K prefer to go into the tax-exempt sector. In the absence of taxes large-K firms go to the sector where they have comparative advantage, which is an empirical condition. Taxes may increase or reduce that advantage, so we do not know anymore. Large K firms employ many workers because they are complements.
Firms are risk neutral (this is implicit in the way they perceive the cost of the probabilities of being caught cheating on taxes), but workers are risk averse. If we think about the labor contract as one between a risk averse individual (the worker) and a risk neutral firm, this explains why firms employ workers. In this model, a firm is defined by a "K-point" hiring an "L". It would be the other way around if agents endowed with K were risk averse, but they are not by assumption. This is not directly relevant to the taxation issue, but it provides a solution to the question of why labor taxation sustains insurance for families: it is optimal in a contract to assign risk to the risk-neutral party. AHL seem surprised by the use of payroll taxes to finance benefits for workers, but to the extent that firms exist to provide insurance to workers, the payroll tax is fully internalized in the value of the contract. This is not inconsistent with corner solutions for some worker-pair firms that would prefer to contract at a lower level of benefits. However, the whole idea of universal social security is to mandate participation, and national regulations can find ways to solve those extreme cases (for example, with subsidies to low income families).
Section 7 summarizes the view of AHL on the motivations for State intervention in insurance markets for human capital. Illness, longevity, disability and death (I understand they refer to death of the breadwinner in the family), justify State guarantees. Work risks and unemployment are risks that can be dealt privately and are internalized in labor contracts. Nevertheless, it is not altogether clear why they make this classification. They mention need as the argument, but the issue is not developed.
Section 7.1 also summarizes the policy proposal. This is to extend the existing general social security program of health insurance to the whole population, and to guarantee a pension to those registered in a new program for 25 years. Roughly, this triples the fiscal commitment to health and pension systems. Notice that housing and day care programs are excluded from the proposal. Some clarifications are in order. On the pension system, the proposal is to pay "a contribution for life, disability and retirement pensions equal to that received by a worker earning two minimum wages". What does it mean to be entitled to a contribution? Do they mean a contribution by the State? Then perhaps it should be called a subsidy equivalent to the contribution made be a worker earning that amount (that is, under pre-reform legislation). What if someone does not register to the new program? The State leaves them without benefit. All individuals already in the formal sector will receive the benefit, but not many of those outside.
Footnote 42 is not accurate with regards to child care. Social security funds often pay family allowances for child care. Mexico may be a special case in that funding and provision of child care are vertically integrated, but caring for children is certainly a main topic for social security around the world.
Section 7.2 argues vehemently that funds for health, disability and retirement shall be strictly separated. It is not explained how the substantial covariation among them will be managed. Yet, an even bigger issue is credibility. Why shall the population expect the government to commit to a long-term financial plan?
In particular, what restricts the government from using social security funds to finance other expenses? Perhaps more than accounting rules, an ambitious reform like the one proposed should include significant governance considerations, such as limits on public debt in social security portfolios or mechanism to separate the system from the electoral cycle. On the issue of international comparisons of revenues from consumption taxes, we have to think also that at current oil prices Mexico becomes something of an oil-state, where the shadow cost for the government of extracting money from firms and consumers is increased to the extent that activities of the State are financed by a proprietary resource.
Without entering the political economy implications of this, which are not part of the paper, if the government were to reduce the taxes on oil and gasoline and other fuels, it would increase the revenues from VAT. At the end, the argument by AHL to defend the size of the projected increase in VAT is one of reasonableness, but there is little support from history or reason to expect such a large change. be more useful to have a given value in the "Fiscal balance" item, and measure how utility changes with it.
Changing to another important topic in the AHL proposal, section 8 on complementary social insurance does not affect the analysis on the reform to the VAT, but it puts a question mark on the labor market analysis. Marginal tax rates remain at significant levels and it does not seem possible to argue anymore that all non-salariedsector B firms will find it attractive to register with tax authorities, and that all salariedsector-A firms that cheat registering lower wages or fewer workers than those in the full payroll will stop doing so. Perhaps few would do it. Page 7 says that all CSI taxes are eliminated, but the proposals say something different (basically, only health taxes are eliminated and disability and retirement taxes are eliminated only for income levels below the minimum wages.
The graphs below show the tax-earnings profiles under current (2011) legislation and under the AHL proposed reforms. The more significant change is that average rates are reduced for low income workers, mainly as a result of the elimination of the per worker payments of social security's health insurance. In general, the profile is lower under the reform because the cash flow is being transferred to the VAT system. Marginal tax rates are pretty much the same because the reform leaves as complementary but mandatory programs essentially all or at least the biggest share of those for workers earning more than the equivalent to two minimum wages. 6 I find that the absence of a discussion of the income tax is a major flaw. Why to ignore the role of the income tax? Can a modern tax system to support the welfare state be designed using only a value added tax? Are the reformers and the researchers in conflict? Actually, if anything, the role of social security contributions has increased in the OECD area, and the role of the income tax as a tool to support the welfare state through alternative forms of the negative income tax has also grown. Far from fatally flawed, the social security taxes have become a common system with income taxes to mix the goal of reducing marginal rates and distributing social benefits at a low cost.
I cannot see how AHL get to Table 16 . The flat 32% rate for contributory social security does not correspond to actual legislation. Existing taxes put total average payments related to the payroll (before income taxes) between 20 and 25% for the vast majority of workers, and after earnings equivalent to 25 minimum wages there is a decline because of the cap to social security contributions. With the proposal this could move to between 10 and 19% if child care and housing are preserved, and 4 and 13% if not. Marginal rates do not change much with the AHL proposal because the tax rate of the IMSS' health insurance for earnings above 3 minimum wages is only 2%, and other contributions are preserved. On one hand, it would be good to have an explicit table to see how the 32% figure is reached;
on the other, the question becomes how strong will be the incentive to register with the tax authorities (as AHL propose), given that the benefits accrue mostly to permanently-very low income workers?
From footnotes 42 and 43, I do not understand if the social security child care programs and the housing fund programs would stop being mandatory or will remain at ease. I infer they would not be mandatory. Elimination would not be fatal because there could be related tax deductions, but it is unlikely that private markets will substitute them, in particular the child care program, because has a clear cross-subsidy component.
Equations 24 and 25 confirm that such is the intention.
Note 52 may be a mistake because the guaranteed pension can be obtained with contributions of 1,250 weeks, and not 50 years. Yet, this does not look like an error, but more as an actual confusion in the nature of public guarantees. A "pre-funded" pension as the one proposed by AHL and a guaranteed pension (in any form known around the world) are the same under perfect information and zero administrative costs. They become different when the system has errors registering periods of either contribution or residency or when there is selection of individuals. I suspect errors are bound to be larger under the AHL proposed mechanism (basically, they believe all individuals older than 18 will register with the tax authorities, and this authority will keep an effective administration of those records), than under a system that pays a guaranteed pension and allows ex-post proof of residence in the country or contributions (as essentially all countries do when granting a guaranteed pension). It will also suffer from bigger selection issues, against women, indigenous people, the less educated and others akin to under-registration with the tax authority.
Page 63 includes a proposal to shift labor contracts from an indemnity rule to a mandatory unemployment insurance rule. Yet, mandatory means only for those participating in what will become the complementary social insurance plan. This proposal is really independent of everything else in the paper and is not developed. It is merited if it reduces the wage gap by eliminating the indemnity rule more than it increases the cost of the payroll through the establishment of unemployment insurance. I tend to agree with it, with the caveat that this is an issue with wide distributional implications: some workers expect never to collect indemnities, while others expect to collect almost with certainty.
Section 9 deals with redistribution and productivity in a tentative way. On redistribution, the first order effect of the proposal is to affect poor households because foodstuffs and drugs have a larger share in the consumption basket. This issue is readily disposed of because by AHL thanks to the huge projected increase in taxation, so the compensation to the poor is relatively small. On productivity, it is argued that "closing the wedge" between different types of labor will eliminate a tax on growth of firms and will increase productivity. They argue first for a 35% increase in productivity but then retract to
leave the issue open. Yet, a selection argument and a Coasian argument can reduce the importance of their estimates. On the first, firms for which growth is more valuable are already in the formal sector, and their marginal taxes are unaffected by the proposal. On the second, vertical integration should solve the problem for any small informal firm expecting even moderate growth. Even if we take at face value the estimates of the increase in productivity from becoming formal (in page 68), this is not warranted given other explanations to informality, such as corruption, bad regulation, high administrative costs of compliance or expensive financing. Are the reformers double-dipping on the researchers?
Section 10 leaves as "implementation issues" the topic that in the opinion of many the true cause of social insurance: mandatory participation. Victor Fuchs put it succinctly in his analysis of health insurance: there are really only two reasons why individuals do not participate in the scheme, they are either too poor or too rich, and the only way to achieve universal insurance is forcing everyone to participate and providing subsidies to those who cannot afford the premiums. Also, the analysis by Samuelson (1958) already mentioned above is explicit in stating the large potential gains from mandatory participation in social insurance. This review is not the space to dwell on these issues, but we can point out to one complexity ignored in the paper. AHL argue that public expenditures on health will increase in 52%, and that services will be the same for all. Considering that more than half of national expenditures are private, this means that national expenditures will increase in roughly 25% (with no crowding out of the private expenses). Yet, this is not enough to achieve equality (two fifths of the health services market will remain private). Following with the same example, but moving to the regulatory side, providing the same service to all involves the introduction of major regulations in the health sector: on selection of plans, on portability, on redistribution of funds across agencies. As far as we can tell, these issues are not secondary and are strongly codetermined with the organization of health insurance and on the way cash flow is collected to finance health services. AHL argue that some benefits have to be provided because of need, and their proposal guarantees them, but we see also that the proposal has major implications on the organization of industries: they propose to reorganize an industry larger than the size of the additional VAT revenue they plan to collect! My conclusion is that these are not implementation issues.
The issue of persistent errors
The initial and the concluding sections argue that there are "vested interests" that profit from having "wage-based taxes", which will be defeated by the force of an idea.
AHL are factually wrong on the way Bismarck reached a decision to establish social insurance, and they espouse an hypothesis on the evolution of ideas that is at odds with what I believe is a better approach from the philosophy and the sociology of science.
We may notice that the AHL proposal shares features with the flat-tax proposal that has been promoted by the Mexican government over the last two administrations (roughly 2001-2012) . Those ideas have actually been reflected in an increase in VAT rates and the adoption of what the government promises will be a flat tax on earnings to eliminate not only social security contributions but also the income tax (this is the entrepreneurial flat tax, IETU). Analogously, the government introduced the Seguro Popular for Health, which in fact has become a NCSI plan in AHL language, but was thought as pretty much the same health insurance as in AHL proposal (at least that is the way it was in the original proposals that led to the Seguro Popular). Thus, the AHL proposal has been tested, probably by the wrong administrators or at the wrong time, we cannot tell. Yet, flat tax proposals have been floated around the world since at least the eighties, more recently by Governor Perry in the United States as part of his primary campaign for the presidency, without much success.
Countries that have adopted flat taxes are a few arising from the socialist block, and it is early to say whether they will evolve to more conventional structures.
On the other hand, other ideas related to taxation and social insurance began as unpopular or more likely they were ignored, and over the decades have established themselves as main tools of the tax and welfare state. Two with persisting influence are the negative income tax and the separation of the State guarantee of an income in old age and disability from the monopoly of annuities. The negative income tax has been adopted in a variety of forms due to institutional and administrative constraints, but it is now an indispensable tool for redistribution and labor policy in the vast majority of OECD countries and in many others (including Mexico). The original negative income tax proposal (at least one of them, the Milton Friedman proposal) also included a flat tax idea, and Robert Hall developed a flat tax proposal that includes a high VAT. Income taxes have in fact become flatter around the world since the eighties, but it is unlikely that a fully flat tax and a high VAT will displace income taxes and social security contributions (not even the Friedman or the Hall versions do that).
The other idea that has gained ground gradually is the break-up of the annuities monopoly. It has been the heart of pension reform, and has allowed the combination of State guarantees, public and private savings, and the development of more efficient schedules for the mandatory participation of citizens in social security. 7 Few remember the original proponents of the negative income tax and of breaking up the state monopoly in annuities, and the ideas have been applied adaptively, but their influence has grown over the decades.
On the other hand, the idea of eliminating mandatory payroll contributions to finance social insurance has hardly had an open field, and as it exists, it does so with substantial caveats. The idea applies mainly to health insurance. However, countries that do not collect taxes for health often charge significant copayments and deductibles, and even more often they rely on strict regulations on consumers and providers to control demand and total expenses. In any case, the application of the idea of financing health insurance with only taxes other than contributions coming from labor contracts is certainly less generalized than the idea of the negative income tax, and perhaps (already or in the not distant future) even than the idea that a national public annuities monopoly is not necessary to sustain a national pension system. Probably, the AHL proposal really refers to health insurance, because for the pension system it leaves the marginal rates of contribution untouched for most workers (in a cross section) and for many more over time (except for the always poor).
Thus, economic ideas and policy ideas are created to solve specific problems.
Sometimes they are convincing and do not face opposition because there is no good alternative in place. In other occasions there must be a long period of struggle and testing to convince society of their goodness. The use of payroll taxes to finance social insurance seems to fit better the first mold. The vast majority of national social security systems use a payroll tax, and AHL is the only proposal I know that proposes its full elimination. A good number of countries (far from a majority) have done it for health insurance with caveats already mentioned above, and as we have discussed, AHL fall into a rhetorical position because they really propose the elimination of only a small part of the taxes on labor. There is a solid movement in tax systems around the world to consolidate three legs to finance the welfare state: the income tax, the general consumption tax and the social security tax. By ignoring this issue altogether, AHL have to end up claiming occult vested interests that defend payroll taxation. If anything, employers' and workers' organizations advocate lower payroll taxes, so I cannot think of a group with interests opposed to the AHL proposal.
In the absence of a guiding hypothesis on how ideas gain influence, the paper also falls into attributing to Bismarck the "idea" of the payroll tax. Being this one of the most researched historical figures of all times, we can state confidently that the issues mentioned by AHL were not at all significant in Bismarck's decision to promote social security legislation. Following the recent Steinberg biography, we can notice that one of his main concerns at the time was to defeat the German States competing with Prussia. Before social security he promoted universal suffrage, a decision from which he repented because while Another idea that has also grown with struggle, but is now widely accepted is that the services insured by social security are hardly ever provided by private markets through individualized models, often not even through collective models. Health insurance is individualized only for a small fraction of high income families even in the wealthiest countries. Private annuities markets are also very small. Also, workmen's compensation is often a state monopoly even in the United States (with a few exceptions that allow to optout, but always sustaining the obligation to insure) or is provided through heavily regulated mutual organizations. Why the obligation to insure has not been enacted in Mexico? This is the relevant political economy question. The policy conflict that motivates AHL is truly the main issue, but it cannot be solved in the field of tax policy; it will have to be faced in the field of service regulation, namely, health insurance, the pension system, unemployment insurance, health and safety and professional risk insurance, and so on.
Summarizing, the tax reform proposal in AHL has a strong economic argument that is supported by various pieces of evidence, but the political economy analysis is weak and runs against our understanding of the way ideas are adopted in economics and in policy.
While I am in agreement with the overall economic argument on tax reform, I wonder whether the response of labor markets will be as large as predicted. On the discussion on the evolution of the ideas, AHL propose a will-to-power solution, to encourage a Bismarckian figure for Mexico to achieve a reform. I believe that a much more profitable effort would be based on a more realistic assessment of the impact of tax reform, and recognition of the need of major regulatory reforms on the benefit side. The problems of health insurance, compensating policies for women, annuities markets, health and safety in the workplace, segregation of persons from indigenous groups and others are unlikely to be touched by any model of tax reform, and they actually define "informality" or segmentation of the social networks. The political economy issue is far from secondary o rhetoric. Even if this idea of tax reform finds its Bismarck, the realities of a segmented labor market may prove difficult to overcome in the absence of policies to deal with its true motivations.
